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INTRODUCTION 
hen judges, lawyers, and law professors discuss tradeoffs, it is 
usually in the context of debates about substantive policies.  
 
* Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service, George 
Washington University Law School. 
W
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Will too much environmental regulation make our industries 
uncompetitive?  Will restricting the grounds for which an employee 
may be fired limit the flexibility of management to control the 
workplace?  Will increasing tort liability for dangerous products stifle 
innovation?  Do certain provisions in the tax code unduly favor one 
industry over another?  In each case there are substantive policies that 
would be advanced or hindered by taking one position or the other.  
Sometimes the courts or legislatures are explicit about the tradeoffs; 
at other times they are not. 
But procedure seems different, at least at first blush, perhaps in part 
because in the federal system the rules are issued by the Supreme 
Court after a lengthy committee process involving judges and 
lawyers, rather than elected legislators.  How can the form of a 
complaint or the time to answer or amend involve tradeoffs in any 
meaningful sense of that word?  Discovery rules can be viewed as 
simply the means by which information is obtained for use at trial, 
and if there are tradeoffs, they are not apparent on the face of the 
rules.  That impression may explain why procedural rules seem so 
bland, and why they are so hard to understand unless the tradeoffs are 
made visible and their bases, along with the reasons why one choice 
rather than another was made, revealed. 
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a perfect 
illustration of hidden tradeoffs.  It directs the courts to do what every 
litigant, lawyer, and judge would support: to administer the Rules “to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”1  The problem is that just results often come slowly 
or expensively.  Or, conversely, a speedy result may not be a just one, 
and even inexpensive cases are not always speedy.  The good news is 
that courts and parties rarely rely on Rule 1, and when they do, it is 
generally as window dressing to support a result reached under 
another Rule.  But to be accurate, Rule 1 should be recast to require 
the courts to provide a “just determination of every action” and to do 
so with “appropriate speed and without undue expense” under the 
circumstances.  Doing that would bring it in line with one of the 
relatively few Rules where the tradeoff is explicit, Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  Under that Rule, the court is directed to limit 
discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the 
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues.”2  Whether that actually helps judges decide real 
cases is another question, but the Rule surely frames the tradeoffs that 
the drafters considered appropriate in resolving discovery disputes. 
I try to show my Civil Procedure students that most rules are 
written to achieve some purpose or to solve some problem that arises 
in litigation.  I then advise them that, unless that purpose or problem 
can be divined, the meaning and operation of the rule and any 
exceptions to it cannot be understood.  Unfortunately, one purpose 
can rarely be advanced without some other purpose being set back, or 
reduced in significance.  That means that there must be a tradeoff, 
hopefully consciously and openly made, even if the evidence of the 
tradeoff is not apparent to most observers or is generally not 
something on which lawyers or judges focus in using a rule of 
procedure.  Yet, for the law student trying to grasp the significance of 
a rule, looking for the tradeoff and appreciating why it was made are 
the surest ways to master a rule and learn how it should be applied.  
Put another way, even the most vanilla-sounding rules are not 
“neutral” because they generally help one side more than the other, 
even if that is not apparent from the face of the rule.  To be sure, some 
tradeoffs are harder to locate than others, and some rules involve a 
tradeoff in only the most theoretical application of that term.  But, by 
and large, the search for a tradeoff is far more likely to be a fruitful 
tool for the student of Civil Procedure than is the assumption that a 
rule of procedure serves no more purpose than does the rule that the 
pitcher’s mound in baseball shall be exactly sixty feet, six inches from 
home plate. 
The common law in fields such as torts, contracts, and property 
was developed on a case-by-case basis, which meant that the 
substantive law was often determined by the facts (which may be 
more favorable for one side than the other).  A major downside of the 
common law is that the outcome is never certain, making compliance 
and planning more difficult for all.  For most procedural rules, the 
value of at least a reasonable degree of certainty is often seen as an 
overriding consideration on the theory that generally a party can 
comply with whatever rule there is, so long as it is known in advance.  
That explains why the procedures by which cases are handled are 
found in rules or statutes rather than developed on a case-by-case 
 
2 Id. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
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basis, as is the common law, although the presence of rules does not 
eliminate disputes over their meaning. 
Before illustrating some of the most significant tradeoffs in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a few other points are worth noting 
because they apply to a number of the specific rules that will be 
discussed.  First, the Rules are supposed to be trans-substantive, 
which is a fancy way of saying that they are supposed to be applicable 
to all the different types of substantive-law claims that are litigated in 
the federal courts.  There are some exceptions in the Rules 
themselves, such as the requirement for greater specificity in pleading 
fraud or mistake in Rule 9(b), and Congress has introduced a 
heightened pleading requirement in complaints alleging violations of 
the federal securities acts.  In some respects the one-size-fits-all 
approach seems odd given the very different substantive policies 
involved and the substantive tradeoffs made in different substantive 
areas of law.  But the goal of having trans-substantive rules can be 
defended as itself a form of tradeoff: it is simpler to have a single set 
of procedural rules for all areas of the law and, therefore, the label 
attached to a cause of action will not have great significance, even if 
the rules work better for some types of claims than others.   
Second, the tradeoffs in the Rules are not fixed, but have been re-
calibrated as circumstances change.  As discussed below, discovery 
may be the clearest example of how the Rules have evolved as 
discovery has become much more significant over the decades.  Most 
recently, electronic record keeping made it possible to discover the 
previously undiscoverable—albeit at considerable burdens of time 
and expense—thereby suggesting a need for a different balancing 
among the competing interests in discovery. 
One of the most dramatic examples of the changing nature of the 
tradeoffs made in the Rules is found in Rule 26(a), which imposes on 
each party the duty to make certain affirmative disclosures.  This 
obligation, first instituted in 1993 on an optional basis for each 
district, was added in an effort to reduce costs and lessen delays, and 
in doing so altered the adversary system so that parties became 
obligated to do more than simply respond to requests made by the 
other side.  Those obligations were lessened in 2000 and made 
uniform for all district courts, as the Rules Committee sought to find 
the proper balance.  Even with those changes, the new Rule represents 
a significantly different tradeoff than did the original version. 
Third, there are tradeoffs in the type of procedural rule that is 
chosen between those that create bright lines and those that instruct 
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the judge to decide the question based on the specific facts of the case 
before her.  Consider two alternative approaches that different rules 
involving time actually embrace.  A defendant is given a specific 
number of days to answer the complaint or to respond to a motion for 
summary judgment, whereas a plaintiff may amend her complaint 
after the initial grace period in Rule 15(a)(2) “when justice so 
requires.”3  Similarly, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i) allows relation back of an 
amended complaint to add a defendant in certain circumstances, 
provided that the defendant “will not be prejudiced” thereby.  And a 
motion to intervene under Rule 24 will be granted if it is “timely,” 
which has been held to include intervention even after a final 
judgment has been entered.4 
The type of rule chosen itself contains a tradeoff between greater 
certainty and greater fairness, which some might call greater 
flexibility.  And, while lawyers are capable of finding grounds to 
litigate the meaning of even those Rules in which the time is set in a 
precise number of days, the decision to focus on prejudice or 
timeliness is almost certain to generate more litigation than one that 
provides a fixed number of days within which some action must be 
taken, but with a greater likelihood of achieving a just result in a 
particular situation.5 
This Article focuses mainly on tradeoffs contained in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which are issued by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, with most of the work done by committees of judges, 
practicing lawyers, and law professors as part of a very public and 
open process.  It also discusses statutes enacted by Congress, mainly 
as they affect the jurisdiction of the courts.  Those statutes also have 
significant impacts on the outcome of disputes and, not surprisingly, 
contain tradeoffs as well.  And finally, Article III of the Constitution, 
which creates limited jurisdiction for the federal courts, is the most 
fundamental tradeoff because it denies the vast majority of lawsuits a 
federal forum and instead prefers state courts as the basic locus for 
litigation. 
 
3 Id. 15(a)(2). 
4 Id. 24(a); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
5 Similar choices apply in substantive areas where Congress has chosen to make the tax 
laws very specific and the antitrust laws much more general. 
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I 
PRE-SUIT 
A.  Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Access to the Federal Courts 
Article III of the Constitution allows federal courts to decide cases 
or controversies only in a limited set of circumstances—itself a 
tradeoff—of which the most important are those cases “arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . 
. under their Authority” (federal question jurisdiction) and 
controversies “between Citizens of different States” (diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction).6 Article III also provides that Congress shall 
determine the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts; Congress has 
chosen not to grant those courts the full extent of the power available 
under Article III. 
When Congress created the federal trial courts under the first 
Judiciary Act, it chose not to allow them to decide federal question 
cases, but limited their role to diversity cases.  Eventually, in 1878, 
Congress decided that the added burden on the federal courts of 
dealing with federal question cases was more than offset by the 
benefit of allowing federal, rather than only state courts, to make the 
initial decisions in cases arising under federal law in the first 
instance.7  But Congress did not open the federal courts to all such 
cases, choosing instead to limit jurisdiction to cases where the amount 
in controversy exceeded a certain sum, initially $500, which was 
raised first to $2000, then to $3000, and finally to $10,000 in 1958.8  
Then in two steps, first in 1976 and then in 1980, Congress reversed 
itself and eliminated the amount in controversy requirement in federal 
question cases.9  In effect, it concluded that keeping some federal 
question cases out of federal court was a bad tradeoff, because it 
meant that state courts were deciding questions of federal law (subject 
to possible review in the Supreme Court) and because the burden on 
the courts of determining whether some federal constitutional claims 
 
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
7 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. 
8 Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 4, 72 Stat. 415. 
9 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721; Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96–486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369. 
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were “worth” more than $10,000 was not worth the benefit of keeping 
a few “small” cases out of the federal courts.10 
For diversity cases, Congress has continued its gatekeeper role by 
limiting federal court jurisdiction to larger cases, currently those in 
excess of $75,000.11  The generally accepted reason for diversity 
jurisdiction in the Constitution is fear that state courts would unduly 
favor local citizens, whereas federal courts, in part because of the 
method of selecting federal judges, would be less inclined to be 
biased in favor of local citizens.12  In theory, that would suggest that 
all diversity cases can be heard in federal court, but Congress has 
consistently rejected that conclusion, largely because, given the 
limited number of federal district judges, they would be overwhelmed 
if every diversity case could be brought in federal court.  Presumably, 
local bias would also be present even in cases involving less than 
$75,000, but Congress decided, at least implicitly, that the tradeoff of 
the burdens on the system of allowing all such cases to be heard in 
federal court was not worth the gain in neutrality to the out-of-state 
litigant in smaller cases. 
Another way that Congress has limited diversity jurisdiction is 
through the rule of complete diversity.  Under complete diversity, all 
parties on one side must be citizens of states different from all parties 
on the other side.  The statutes governing diversity jurisdiction do not 
mention complete diversity, but the Supreme Court interpreted them 
to require it.13  Congress has never rejected that reading, but it has 
created exceptions where it found that the general tradeoff gained 
from limiting federal courts to complete diversity was not justified.  A 
prominent example of Congress reaching a different balance on 
federal versus state court for diversity cases is found in the Federal 
Interpleader Act of 1917,14 under which the federal courts have 
 
10 Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(“Certainly they may be difficult of evaluation, but ‘priceless’ does not necessarily mean 
‘worthless.’”). 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
12 A similar rationale also explains why the Constitution gives aliens access to federal 
courts, but it does not explain why Congress allows U.S. citizens to choose a federal forum 
to sue an alien.  The same mismatch occurs in diversity cases where a citizen can bring a 
case in federal court in her home state when there is no arguable prejudice to the plaintiff 
if the case were heard in her own state court, but a defendant cannot remove a case to 
federal court if it is brought in a state court in his home state.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
13 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806). 
14 Federal Interpleader Act of 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1335). 
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jurisdiction so long as there is diversity between any two adverse 
claimants.  The Act was passed to deal with situations in which there 
are several claimants to a fixed fund, often an insurance policy, and 
the claimants live in different states, such that it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain personal jurisdiction over all of them in any 
state court.  Because the claims do not arise under federal law, the 
only way to get the cases into a federal forum is through diversity, 
and even that might be thwarted if complete diversity were required 
and two of the claimants were citizens of the same state.  Because 
Congress concluded that the benefits of having a federal forum to 
resolve these interstate matters was more important than limiting 
access to the federal courts by mandating complete diversity, it 
allowed minimal diversity and set the amount in controversy at 
$500.15  In short, Congress simply made a different tradeoff for that 
limited set of cases. 
In the late 1980s, Congress was faced with a similar kind of choice 
about whether to relax some of the rules on subject matter jurisdiction 
in cases involving multiple parties where there was subject matter 
jurisdiction as to some but not all of the parties or claims.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court had decided a series of cases, generally finding that 
these additional parties could not be added,16 although the Court was 
more generous with additional claims against existing parties.17  The 
result was that some parties were forced to litigate the same basic 
dispute in both federal and state courts,18 which produced additional 
costs and some procedural unfairness.  It was undisputed that, because 
there was subject matter jurisdiction for at least one claim in each 
case, there was no constitutional barrier to relaxing the rules on 
adding parties or claims; rather, the issue was which tradeoffs were 
appropriate to make, recognizing that any relaxation of these 
requirements would add to the workload of the federal courts by some 
probably indeterminable amount. 
Congress took two different routes, depending on the basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction.  If there is federal question jurisdiction, 
then parties and claims could be added if they were part of the same 
case or controversy.19  But for diversity cases, the next subsection 
specified certain rules under which claims and parties could not be 
 
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
17 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
18 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
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added in diversity cases, thereby maintaining the old balance, which 
meant that efficiency of litigation gave way to keeping cases (or at 
least some parties and some claims) out of the federal courts.20  
Unfortunately, Congress did a very poor job of drafting and left out of 
the list of Federal Rules for which joinder was barred the class action 
rule—Rule 23—and some, but not all applications of Rule 20.  Cases 
involving those provisions went to the Supreme Court, which held 
that the failure to include those provisions in § 1367(b) meant that the 
general rule applicable to non-diversity cases applied, and so 
additional, non-qualifying parties could be joined under those rules.21  
As the dissent pointed out, viewed from the perspective of 
congressional purposes, it is hard to see why Congress would have 
wanted to bring into the federal courts the much larger group of more 
complex class actions but exclude much smaller cases affected by      
§ 1367(b), which is what the majority said Congress had done.22  Put 
another way, the basic tradeoff in subsection (b) of less efficiency for 
diversity cases is understandable as a general proposition but seems 
very difficult to defend while allowing some, but not all, much more 
burdensome cases, such as class actions, to come to federal court. 
The class action ruling under the supplemental jurisdiction statute 
will have only minor practical consequences because, while the Court 
was considering Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)23 that greatly 
expanded the ability of parties to litigate state-law-based class actions 
in federal court.  Prior Supreme Court rulings interpreted the diversity 
jurisdiction provision to require that all members of the class have 
claims of more than $75,000,24 which meant that very few class 
actions based on state law could be heard in federal court.  In the 
1970s, it was generally plaintiffs who wanted to expand class action 
jurisdiction in federal courts, because they saw them as more 
favorable fora, but by the twenty-first century, it was the defendants 
who were seeking refuge in federal courts from class actions filed in 
state courts, often in venues that were considered very pro-plaintiff.  
Defendants generally thought that federal courts were less likely to 
 
20 Id. § 1367(b). 
21 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). 
22 Id. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
23 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)). 
24 See, e.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973). 
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grant class certification than were at least some state courts (mainly 
those where plaintiffs elected to file).  Defendants also wanted to be 
able to consolidate cases where there were multiple similar actions 
filed in different states, which was possible only if the cases could be 
removed to the federal courts.  One barrier to consolidation was that 
the federal removal statute applicable to diversity cases applied only 
where none of the defendants was a citizen of the state in which the 
case was filed.25  That limitation was itself a tradeoff between 
allowing a diversity defendant the choice of removal and precluding it 
when the defendant was in its home state, where presumably it would 
not be subject to local bias. 
CAFA produced a major change in the diversity tradeoff.26  First, 
as to amount in controversy, it became $5 million total (instead of 
$75,000 for each class member), provided that there were one 
hundred or more class members.27  Second, for diversity, CAFA 
opted for minimal diversity, meaning that if one plaintiff class 
member and one defendant are diverse, the citizenship of the 
remainder of the class and of the other defendants is irrelevant.  And 
third, one defendant can remove without requiring all defendants to 
join in the removal.28  Thus, for a variety of reasons, including, for 
some supporters, the desire to limit the effectiveness of class actions, 
Congress decided that the benefits of making available a federal 
forum for major class actions offset concerns about flooding the 
federal courts with state-law cases.  Congress attempted to soften the 
effect of the change by providing for remands in some 
circumstances;29 however, the extent of the ability of plaintiffs to 
obtain remands is seriously in doubt, and in all likelihood, those 
provisions will prove to be relatively unimportant.30 
A final tradeoff in this area involves the question of how to define 
the “citizenship” of a corporation.  Congress first made the obvious 
choice of the state of incorporation and then added principal place of 
business.31  Because of the rule of complete diversity, adding 
 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 
26 See id. § 1332(d). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. § 1453. 
29 Id. § 1332(d)(2), (3). 
30 A slightly different set of tradeoffs involving mass accidents is contained in 28 
U.S.C. § 1369.  That provision relaxes the rule of complete diversity where there are at 
least seventy-five natural persons who died (not merely injured, although injured persons 
may intervene) in a single discrete accident in certain prescribed situations. 
31 Id. § 1332(c)(1). 
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principal place of business reduced the opportunities for corporations 
to sue or be sued in federal court.  Moreover, and perhaps more 
significantly, it precluded them from removing cases to federal court 
if they were sued where they had their principal place of business.  
The term principal place of business could have several meanings, 
and in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the Court decided that the more readily 
ascertainable “nerve center” test was the proper one, in part because it 
concluded that Congress wanted as close to a bright-line rule as 
possible in this area in order to minimize preliminary and collateral 
litigation.32  The choice was in some respects between certainty and 
simplicity on one hand, and complexity and, in some cases, greater 
fairness and adherence to the concerns about prejudice against out-of-
state persons, which animates the diversity rationale, on the other, 
with tradeoffs present under both options. 
B.  Venue and Related Issues 
Once a plaintiff has decided whether to file in federal or state court, 
and assuming that the defendant is amenable to suit in a variety of 
locations, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 imposes some modest restrictions on 
where the case may be brought.33  Congress has also concluded that, 
even though venue is supposed to be a proxy for convenience—notice 
the similarity of roots of the two words—there are some cases in 
which the forum chosen meets the venue and personal jurisdiction 
requirements, but the case should nonetheless be transferred to 
another forum where the case might have been brought “[f]or the 
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”34  The 
inquiry is very fact-dependent, and the burden is on the party seeking 
the transfer to overcome the presumption that the plaintiff, who has 
the burden of proof, should be deprived of his chosen forum.  Despite 
these obstacles, some cases can be transferred to another federal court 
because Congress has made the judgment that, in those situations, the 
desire of the plaintiff to litigate in one place must take a backseat to 
the convenience of other parties and witnesses. 
Another tradeoff in this area was created for quite different reasons 
and is limited to pretrial proceedings.  In 28 U.S.C. § 1407, Congress 
created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which has the 
 
32 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193–94 (2010). 
33 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
34 Id. § 1404(a). 
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power to transfer cases involving common questions of fact to a 
single court.  The rationale for this provision is to assure consistency 
and increase efficiency by consolidating pretrial matters—ranging 
from discovery to class certification to motions for summary 
judgment—before one federal judge.  The interests of individual 
plaintiffs (and perhaps even some defendants) in handling these 
pretrial matters in a more convenient forum are submerged to the 
efficiency interests of the courts and all the parties with similar claims 
in centralized litigation.  In Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad 
Hynes & Lerach, the Court ruled that § 1407 required a retransfer 
back to the original forum for trial (perhaps because it was thought to 
be fairer to the plaintiff to return to her chosen forum).35  While 
Congress has debated changing that rule, to date it has not acted, 
meaning that the district judge who is most familiar with the case 
cannot try it. 
II 
BEGINNING THE LAWSUIT 
A.  The Complaint 
The drafters provided in Rule 8(a)(2) that a federal court complaint 
need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 
that the pleader is entitled to relief,”36 a practice commonly referred 
to as “notice pleading.”  The Rule also requires that the complaint 
include a statement as to the basis for subject matter jurisdiction, but 
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, that is hardly 
a surprising or burdensome requirement.  Indeed, including it serves 
as a check to remind counsel that they must satisfy that requirement 
or the case will be dismissed.  The complaint need not include 
anything on personal jurisdiction or venue—which are also bases for 
dismissal or transfer—perhaps because they can be waived, unlike 
subject matter jurisdiction.  The sample forms also show how simple 
a complaint can be, although many lawyers choose to make them 
more complex (and for some lawyers much more complex) than is 
needed.  The relief sought does not have to request a specific dollar 
amount, although if the basis of jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, 
it must at least allege that the requisite amount in controversy is met.  
 
35 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
36 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
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And even though a complaint initiates a lawsuit, it need not contain 
citations to the applicable law, although it often does. 
Beyond permitting complaints to be simple, there are two related 
tradeoffs that have an important role in enabling plaintiffs to start a 
lawsuit in federal court.37  First, at least in many cases, the complaint 
can be very general in its allegations regarding, for example, the 
cause of the injury to the plaintiff.  It is enough to assert that the 
defendant drove his car negligently in striking the plaintiff’s vehicle, 
without specifying that the defendant drove too fast, ran a red light, or 
was talking on his cell phone.  Even if the complaint is specific, it can 
be amended to add new specifics or delete others as the case 
proceeds.  Similarly, and as a practical matter of greater importance, 
especially in a case where the defendant has exclusive access to most 
of the important evidence on what caused the plaintiff’s injury, a 
general allegation of, for example, defective design or manufacture of 
a product, will suffice.  This latter example illustrates a tradeoff in the 
Rules that makes it easier—and in some cases actually makes it 
possible—for a plaintiff to start his lawsuit even though he and his 
lawyers cannot provide more details about what caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.  The Rules thus make a conscious choice to let plaintiffs sue 
when they cannot be specific about major issues in the case, even 
though in some cases the defendant will have to hire a lawyer and 
spend time to rebut a case that turns out to have no basis.  To many 
defendants, that tradeoff seems unfair, but the counterargument is that 
it is more unfair to permit a defendant to avoid liability because the 
plaintiff cannot learn enough to file a case if the defendant has the key 
evidence under its control. 
There are a few situations in which there is a different tradeoff.  
Rule 9(b) requires that fraud or mistake be pled “with particularity,” 
but certain other arguably similar states of mind, such as malice, need 
not.  The rationale behind the fraud exception sometimes is stated to 
be based on reputational harm, but since a complaint may allege, 
without particularity, that the defendant is a liar, murderer, or child 
molester, that supposed rationale for Rule 9(b) is hard to defend.  It 
would also not explain why Rule 9(b) also requires that a complaint 
alleging even an innocent “mistake” must have additional specificity.  
The better view is that a claim of fraud is too general and does not 
 
37 The continued viability of those tradeoffs in light of recent Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting Rule 8 is discussed infra. 
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give the defendant sufficient information to begin to prepare a 
defense, which is why particularity is required for claims of fraud and 
mistake.  In those specific kinds of cases, the rationales for allowing 
notice pleading are overcome by the competing needs of a defendant 
to be able to start a defense, and hence a different tradeoff was made.  
But in both the general rule and the exception, one cannot understand 
what the Rules are doing unless one understands the reasons behind 
both Rules and the tradeoffs that they embody. 
The second tradeoff relates to the first but is slightly different in 
effect and results.  It can most clearly be illustrated by focusing on a 
case where fraud is alleged, and hence the complaint must be specific 
as to whether, for example, the defendant’s sale of its stock was 
fraudulent because it failed to include certain expenses in its income 
statement or it knowingly overvalued accounts receivable on its 
balance sheet.  The question still remains, how much evidence 
(admissible or otherwise) must the plaintiff have, at the time he files 
the complaint, in order to support his allegations of fraud?  In general, 
the Rules allow a plaintiff, or more accurately his lawyer, to make 
such allegations so long as he has a good-faith belief that the facts are 
true and that proof can be obtained through discovery.38  In short, not 
very much is required, which many defendants argue is an ill-advised 
tradeoff.  Whatever one thinks of that tradeoff, there is no doubt that 
it helps plaintiffs stay in court until they can take discovery, a result 
that a higher level of required prefiling proof would not allow. 
This tradeoff was, for a period in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
different when Rule 11 was tightened in response to alleged abuses by 
counsel for plaintiffs in bringing frivolous cases.  After a relatively 
brief experiment, the Rule was changed back to close to its original 
balance, largely because the alternative tradeoff was thought to 
unduly discourage meritorious litigation by placing counsel and 
clients at risk of being forced to pay heavy monetary sanctions.  There 
was also another undesirable side effect of the stricter sanctions Rule: 
it led to extensive collateral litigation over whether a pleading lacked 
a reasonable factual or legal basis, which many judges found 
unpleasant, time-consuming, and often counterproductive.  This 
example also illustrates the proposition that, in designing rules, it is 
important to consider their administrability and to be wary of 
theoretically perfect rules that necessitate extensive litigation to carry 
out, especially when the additional litigation is unrelated to the merits.  
 
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
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As we will see below, sometimes the Rules prefer fairness (and 
complexity) over ease of administration, but not always. 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have called into question 
whether the balance that generally was thought to have been struck in 
Rule 8, favoring allowing cases to proceed beyond the motion-to-
dismiss stage unless the plaintiff’s claim was insufficient as a matter 
of law, continues to exist, although the text of Rule 8 remains 
unchanged.  Without exploring their rationales in detail, or debating 
whether the Court’s interpretations of Rule 8 were proper, there can 
be little doubt that the decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly39 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal40 imposed a pleading standard for complaints 
that gave greater weight to the interests of defendants in avoiding 
discovery and in having to defend against the plaintiff’s claims than 
had previously been the law.  Quite apart from the question of 
whether the balance struck in those cases is the proper one, there is 
also a substantial issue as to whether the Court should have, in effect, 
reset the balance in Rule 8 by reinterpreting the Rule, or do what it 
has done in the past when similar pleas were made: relegate the issue 
to the Civil Rules Committee to do the job. 
The Rules Committee has begun an examination of Rule 8, and 
Congress has also considered restoring what some considered to be 
the status quo ante pre-Twombly while the Committee decides what 
the appropriate tradeoff should be and whether Rule 8 is the place to 
make any adjustment.  There are many possible alternatives to both 
the prior and the current understandings of Rule 8, and the Rules 
Committee is best equipped to evaluate where the proper balance lies 
and how to craft a rule reflecting the desired tradeoff.  By way of 
illustration, I have included as an Appendix a proposal under which a 
plaintiff would be given the opportunity to present his claim to the 
putative defendant before filing suit, in effect as a means of testing 
the waters.  If the defendant did not provide a basis for contesting the 
plaintiff’s factual allegations, the plaintiff’s burden of pleading in the 
complaint would be minimal.  However, if the defendant chose to 
disclose its version of the facts (and perhaps the law), the plaintiff 
would have to include more in the complaint to survive a motion to 
dismiss.  The proposal embodies a series of tradeoffs that are different 
from those under current law, but it is hopefully a means of increasing 
 
39 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
40 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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the fairness of the process to plaintiffs, as they see the law after Iqbal, 
and to defendants, as they saw it before Twombly. 
B.  Service of Pleadings 
Filing a complaint is the first step in a federal court case; after that, 
the defendant must be served.  Leaving aside the due process and 
statutory questions about when a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant, the rules also must establish the proper 
means to effect service of the complaint.  Again, assuming no 
constitutional problems with the particular method of providing 
notice, the choice involves tradeoffs between competing values in at 
least two respects: who may accept service on behalf of the defendant, 
and who is eligible to make that service? 
If the defendant is an individual, is service on the defendant’s 
spouse at the defendant’s residence sufficient?  What about on one of 
the defendant’s children, or might the answer depend on the age of 
the child?  What about others residing with the defendant, or his co-
workers?  Might the nature of the suit matter, or the amount in 
controversy, or would such differences lead to disputes over 
peripheral issues, what I call “side shows”?  Suppose the defendant is 
a corporation or an agency of government that can act only through 
individuals: must the CEO or agency head be the one who receives 
the complaint, and if not, should the rules take into account the 
possibility that the complaint will not be delivered to the appropriate 
person within the entity? 
As for the person making service, at one time the Federal Rules 
required that someone in the office of the U.S. Marshal for the district 
in which the case was filed conduct all service of process by 
personally delivering the summons and complaint to the defendant or 
other person authorized to accept service.41  That was thought 
necessary so that there would be no disputes about whether the 
certificate of service was truthful, but it also proved very costly and 
became nearly impossible to continue as the federal court civil 
caseloads increased from 34,734 civil filings in 1940—shortly after 
the Rules went into effect—to 168,789 in 198042 when the 
predecessor of current Rule 4(c)(2) was changed to allow any person 
 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) advisory committee’s note (1980) (suggesting that the 
requirement for service by the Marshal was not absolute and deciding to make clear that it 
is only one option). 
42 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 3 
tbl.3 (1980). 
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over the age of eighteen, not a party to the case, to effect service.  Did 
that mean that there were no post-1980 disputes over service of 
process?  Of course not.  But the drafters were willing to accept some 
additional litigation as a tradeoff for the reduction in cost of service of 
process and the delays that ensued when only the Marshal’s office 
was permitted to do the job.  In addition, service by mail is acceptable 
in some circumstances now,43 not because the mail system is perfect, 
but because the risk of nondelivery is relatively small, it can be 
guarded against by other means, and the convenience and lower cost 
are thought to be worth the tradeoff in certainty.  And once the parties 
have entered their appearances through counsel in the case, service by 
mail (and now e-mail) is the norm for similar reasons of cost and 
efficiency. 
Similar tradeoffs of efficiency versus certainty also apply when it 
comes to who is a proper person to accept service for an individual or 
an entity.  Rule 4(e)(2)(B) allows the person making service to leave 
the complaint with a person of suitable age at the home of the 
defendant on the theory that such persons will generally see that the 
actual defendant receives it promptly.  The contrary rule would result 
in added costs of attempting service and in delays in moving the case 
forward.  Those might initially be borne by the plaintiff, but it would 
also be possible to shift those costs to the defendant if the plaintiff 
prevails.  The tradeoff that allows service on others who live with the 
defendant has not been extended to allow service when the recipient 
is not a resident of the home but simply a coworker.  However, when 
the complaint relates to the work of a business or government agency, 
other practical rules apply, and service can be made in ways that 
provide reasonable but less-than-total assurance that the persons who 
need to see the complaint will receive it.  These kinds of tradeoffs 
differ from those made in creating Rule 8, governing the contents of a 
complaint, because they do not make it easier for one side to remain 
in court and perhaps even to prevail.  Rather, they are part of an 
overall effort to reduce cost and delay to all parties, notwithstanding a 
small risk of error that is considered to be an acceptable tradeoff for 
the offsetting benefits. 
 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(G); id. 4(e)(1) (allowing service by mail in accordance with 
state law); id. 4(i) (explaining when service on the United States and its officers and 
agencies may be made by registered or certified mail). 
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C.  Defendant’s Response Options 
Generally, most defendants have twenty-one days after being 
served with the summons and complaint in which to answer or move 
to dismiss the complaint on one of the grounds set forth in Rule 
12(b).44  The Rules could have given defendants a “reasonable time” 
to reply, which is what happens in the real world becase motions for 
extension are routinely agreed to by the plaintiff’s counsel or granted 
by the court.  But having a fixed time in the Rules eliminates some 
but not all uncertainty, as evidenced by the complexity of Rule 6 on 
computing time.  Given the ease with which extensions are granted, 
the actual number of days is not crucial, because the Rules simply set 
a default time period and give an indication of what might be 
considered reasonable—in contrast to five days or five months. 
As noted above, plaintiffs do not have to provide any “law” in their 
complaint, let alone cite relevant cases to support their claim.  If that 
seems unfair to defendants, Rule 12(b) gives them a chance to go on 
the attack and ask the court to dismiss the case on any of several 
grounds, the most significant one being that the plaintiff fails to state 
a claim on which relief may be granted.  In plain terms, this means 
that the plaintiff has no legal claim based on the facts set forth in the 
complaint.  If the defendant contends that the plaintiff has no viable 
legal theory, the defendant must accept as true all of the facts alleged 
in the complaint.  Thus, for example, in an auto accident case, where 
the claim is that the defendant passenger distracted the driver by 
talking to him and caused the driver to hit the car in which the 
plaintiff was riding, the passenger could move to dismiss that claim 
on the ground that the law does not make a passenger liable to a third 
party even if the alleged distraction was a factual cause of the 
accident.  Alternatively, the defendant might move to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that the accident took place three years ago 
and all such cases have to be filed within two years from the date of 
the accident or they are barred.  But the defendant could not move to 
dismiss on the ground that he did nothing to distract the driver 
because that dispute is factual rather than legal. 
In responding to such a motion, the plaintiff cannot simply say that 
she has not yet had a chance to prove her case or had time to do all 
the necessary legal research, but must answer the defendant’s legal 
arguments, often with just a modest extension of time beyond the 
fourteen days allowed in the Rules.  In some cases, the basis of the 
 
44 Id. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). 
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motion will be that the plaintiff failed to allege an essential element of 
the claim—for example, a federal antitrust violation must involve 
interstate commerce.45  If the court agrees, it will generally allow the 
plaintiff an opportunity to remedy defects of that kind by filing an 
amended complaint, another practice that helps a plaintiff stay in 
court and have a chance to prove her case.  If an amended complaint 
is filed, the defendant can once again move to dismiss, and if that 
motion is granted, the plaintiff will generally not be given a further 
chance to amend. 
Many defendants do not consider the opportunity to file a motion 
to dismiss an adequate tradeoff for having to respond to a complaint 
that they consider meritless.  However, it at least gives defendants 
some chance of getting rid of a case early in the process, before the 
expenses of discovery are incurred.  And whether it is in fact adequate 
is of less significance than is the fact that the tradeoff was consciously 
made based on a desire to see that plaintiffs are given a reasonable 
opportunity to establish the merits of their claim, including taking 
discovery if they are shown to have a valid legal claim but need to 
gather factual support for it. 
D.  Attorneys’ Fees 
Another essential element of our civil justice system involves two 
rules relating to attorneys’ fees.  Although not part of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, they are at least as significant as the notice 
concept for complaints in making it possible for ordinary people to 
pursue civil claims for money damages.  The first is called the 
American Rule, under which each side bears the costs of paying its 
own attorney, as well as many but not all costs of litigation, win or 
lose.46  The reason that this matters so much is that a plaintiff who has 
a claim against a well-financed defendant may be willing to risk 
losing the case, and perhaps having to pay his own lawyer, but the 
prospect of having to pay for defense counsel as well, which is 
generally the law in England,47 could make the risk so great that the 
case is not worth bringing.  This pro-plaintiff rule also means that, if 
some dubious cases are brought, defendants will have to pay their 
 
45 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890). 
46 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009). 
47 Id. at 609 (defining the English rule, under which “a losing litigant must pay the 
winner’s costs and attorney’s fees”). 
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own lawyers to get them dismissed.  The tradeoff is nonetheless 
considered, on balance, better than having valid claims not brought 
because of a fear of having to pay counsel fees for the defendant.  
Indeed, both Congress and state legislatures have passed laws that 
require losing defendants, but generally not losing plaintiffs, to pay 
the fees of their opponents where, for reasons of public policy, the 
legislature wished to make bringing certain kinds of lawsuits—the 
most significant being claims for civil rights violations—more 
attractive, and hence changed the tradeoff to create a one-way shifting 
of attorneys’ fees for those cases.48 
The second rule allows a client to agree to pay a lawyer only if the 
client wins or obtains a favorable settlement, and to use the resulting 
award for that payment.  Known as “contingent fees,” they are, in 
conjunction with the American Rule, a major assist to plaintiffs who 
wish to bring a lawsuit, often for personal injury claims, but cannot 
afford to pay their lawyer if they lose.  There is at least one exception: 
contingent fees are generally not permitted in criminal cases and in 
matrimonial matters, on the theory that the potential for misconduct in 
those cases creates improper incentives, thus making the tradeoff 
undesirable from a public policy perspective.49  In the real world, 
those restrictions are evaded by entering fixed-fee agreements, which 
are realistically capable of being fulfilled only if the defendant is 
acquitted (or receives a very light sentence) or the client achieves a 
favorable resolution in the divorce.  There have been various 
proposals to modify these rules, generally to make them more 
favorable to defendants, but there is little likelihood that the current 
tradeoffs will be changed in any significant respect in the United 
States in the near future. 
E.  Rule 11 
The previous Subparts discussed the tradeoffs that generally favor 
the plaintiffs both in allowing complaints to go forward without actual 
proof of the factual allegations and in not requiring losing plaintiffs to 
pay the fees of a prevailing defendant.  Rule 11, which allows courts 
to order payment of the other side’s attorneys’ fees in some situations, 
is a modest counterweight to that balancing of interests.  Of equal 
significance is that its three-part history shows how the tradeoffs in 
this area have been significantly recalibrated from time to time, in 
 
48 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
49 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2011). 
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part based on less-than-satisfactory experience with the Rule as then 
in effect.50 
As issued in 1938, Rule 11 was largely hortatory: attorneys should 
stop, look, and listen before filing pleadings, but nothing was done if 
they failed in this duty—except in what everyone would agree are the 
most egregious situations.  Objections were raised, almost entirely by 
defense counsel and their clients, that the Rule should be amended to 
add teeth in order to discourage frivolous litigation, and in 1983 the 
Supreme Court approved amendments that radically altered the role 
of Rule 11.  Without going into great detail, the major changes were: 
(a) sanctions became mandatory if a violation was found, with 
attorneys’ fees to the other side as the preferred remedy; (b) clients, as 
well as lawyers, could be held responsible for unwarranted assertions 
of law; and (c) lawyers were required to more closely question their 
clients on assertions of fact,51 such that they almost became required 
to take an adversary position to them.  Sanction motions routinely 
accompanied motions to dismiss, and the threat of seeking sanctions 
was often employed by defendants.  Courts were often required to 
hold sanction hearings and to determine appropriate fees to be paid by 
both clients and lawyers.  In theory, defendants and their lawyers 
could have been held liable under the Rule, but almost all of the 
activity was aimed at plaintiffs, especially in civil rights cases.  A 
veritable cottage industry developed on Rule 11, but it also stimulated 
very substantial backlash, including from judges who found the Rule 
to be burdensome and distracting from their main duties. 
Ten years later, the Court largely reversed itself and brought Rule 
11 back much closer to the 1938 version than to the 1983 edition.  
Sanctions were no longer mandatory even if a violation was found; a 
twenty-one-day safe harbor was created to allow a party to amend or 
withdraw a pleading in that time, without incurring the risk of 
sanctions;52 attorneys’ fees were no longer the remedy of choice;53 
and clients were no longer held accountable for the bad legal advice 
that their lawyers gave them.54  In addition, factual allegations can be 
 
50 Sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, are also available under Rule 37(b) in discovery 
disputes; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is also a source of fee shifting in some circumstances.  For 
purposes of this Article, Rule 11 illustrates the point in sufficient detail without discussing 
other sources of fee shifting and the tradeoffs they entail. 
51 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983). 
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (1993). 
53 Id. 11(c)(4)–(5). 
54 Id. 11(b)(2) (only counsel and unrepresented parties subject to this requirement). 
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safely made “on information and belief” if the lawyer identified them 
as such, provided that the lawyer reasonably believed that those 
allegations “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”55 
This three-part history of Rule 11 illustrates both the differing 
tradeoffs that are possible in dealing with the problem of what level of 
pre-suit investigation a plaintiff and her counsel must make, and how 
judgments as to the appropriate balance changed over time and with 
experience under other options.  There are still some, again mainly on 
the defense side, who are unhappy with the balance, but there is no 
significant movement to use Rule 11 as an additional counterweight 
to the notice-pleading concept or the American Rule on attorneys’ 
fees.  The tradeoffs in Rule 11 seem in equipoise at least for the time 
being. 
F.  Discovery 
It may be difficult for civil litigators today to realize that, until the 
Federal Rules became the law in 1938, there was very little discovery 
in most civil cases in the United States.  Although perhaps never 
spelled out fully, the rationales for only a limited discovery regime 
include the reality that discovery costs money and causes delays.  To 
some, the concept of discovery runs counter to the notion that each 
side in the adversary system should prepare its own case and not be 
required to help the opponent.  The Federal Rules make a different set 
of tradeoffs: justice is served by having the truth come out at trial, and 
that is best accomplished by full pretrial discovery of what each side 
knows, which may also lead to earlier, or at least better-informed, 
settlements.  That choice is not without downsides, which include 
significant increases in costs and new (and sometimes excessive) 
burdens on the party who is on the receiving end of some discovery 
requests.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, also adopted by 
the Supreme Court, make a quite different judgment about the 
desirability of pretrial discovery.56  Under them, discovery is quite 
limited, subject to the constitutional requirement—itself a form of 
tradeoff—that the prosecutor furnish the defendant with exculpatory 
evidence in his possession.57  Furthermore, civil justice systems in 
other countries (and in most states for many years after the Federal 
 
55 Id. 11(b)(3). 
56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
57 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, but not today) have made 
different tradeoffs and do not have anywhere near the kind of 
extensive discovery allowed under our Federal Rules. 
Within this broad pro-discovery regime, there are various 
provisions that alter the balance, at least to some degree.  Until 1970, 
Rule 34 required parties to seek court approval for requests for the 
production of documents from another party, although parties often 
agreed to produce at least some documents without a court order.  The 
apparent rationale under the original Rule was that examining the 
opponent’s records was a highly invasive process, unlike answering 
interrogatories or having one of your witnesses examined orally at a 
deposition, and hence required court supervision.  But as document 
production became more common, and judges were burdened and 
costs were increased because of the necessity of filing routine motions 
to produce documents, Rule 34 was changed to require the person on 
whom the request was served to answer it or to object, with the 
requesting party then being forced to file a motion if it wished to 
challenge the objection.  Similarly, under Rule 45, until 1991, a party 
wishing to obtain documents from a third party could do so only by 
serving a subpoena on that third party with a notice to take an oral 
deposition and a request that the deponent bring certain documents.58  
The Rule has been changed so that a third-party subpoena can now 
seek only documents without the necessity of having the custodian 
show up and present them—a recognition that burdens and costs 
needed to be adjusted in light of current litigation practices. 
Several other aspects of discovery involve somewhat different 
tradeoffs.  The principle of full discovery was tested early on in 
Hickman v. Taylor.59  Plaintiffs requested a wide range of documents 
from the defendant, including copies of witness statements obtained 
by counsel (or investigators hired by counsel), counsel’s notes of 
meetings with witnesses, and summaries of oral meetings with 
witnesses for which there were no statements or notes.60  The 
Supreme Court ruled that the request was for a category of documents 
that the circuit court labeled the “work product of the lawyer” and 
held that, because the plaintiffs could interview or depose those 
witnesses, they should not be allowed, in effect, to freeload on the 
work of the defendant’s counsel and, perhaps more importantly, gain 
 
58 FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (1990) (amended 1991). 
59 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
60 Id. at 498–99. 
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access to their thought processes by the use of this form of discovery, 
absent some special need or justification, such as the death of a 
witness.61  To reach that result, the Court construed the Rules, which 
were completely silent on this issue, to create an implied privilege, 
with a different set of tradeoffs than the general rule of broad 
discovery—a result that has since been codified in Rule 26(b)(3).  
Like the original Court opinion, that Rule is not absolute but allows 
discovery of some work product if there is a showing of substantial 
need and undue hardship in obtaining the information elsewhere.  
Even then the court is required to protect against revealing the 
lawyer’s mental processes regarding the case. 
A third example of a different implicit tradeoff relates to discovery 
involving a party’s expert witnesses.  Without some special rule, the 
plaintiff could ask the defendant the name of any expert that the 
defendant had consulted regarding the case, and then the plaintiff 
could take that person’s deposition, paying only the normal minimal 
witness fee owed to ordinary fact witnesses, and do the same for 
every expert who was consulted.  The Rules, including recent 
amendments that make somewhat different tradeoffs, now limit 
discovery to experts a party has identified as potential trial witnesses, 
and even they can be deposed only after they have submitted a report 
concerning their proposed testimony.62  The expert witness is entitled 
to be paid at his or her commercial rates, for preparation and for 
attending the deposition, by the party taking the deposition.63 
Finally, there is the tradeoff on the scope of discovery.  It is clear 
that discovery is not objectionable because it seeks evidence that may 
be inadmissible, so long as it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence.”64  That limitation is quite 
modest, and parties, especially in the most significant commercial 
cases, began to request extremely broad and burdensome discovery.  
Because the requesting party did not know what would be produced, 
 
61 Id. at 509–11. 
62 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A) (2010). 
63 Id. 26(b)(4)(E)(i)–(ii).  Another recent amendment added Rules 26(b)(4)(B)–(C), 
under which communications between counsel and their testifying experts are generally 
not discoverable (except for information about fee arrangements and a few other limited 
subjects).  The reason for the limitation is that the present system was found to be 
inefficient and, for lawyers who knew the system, easy to evade by not putting discussions 
in writing.  This and another change in Rule 26(a)(2)(C) regarding discovery of witnesses 
who provided both factual and expert testimony are further indications of the ever-shifting 
nature of the various tradeoffs in the rules on discovery from expert witnesses. 
64 Id. 26(b)(1). 
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it was impossible to know in advance whether it would produce 
relevant information.  In addition, not all information that is 
technically relevant is of equal significance in a case, and the burden 
of producing some documents may be much greater than producing 
others. 
One answer that the Rules provide is to require that information 
sought be relevant to the “party’s claim or defense” in the case, while 
allowing discovery as to the “subject matter” only with court approval 
and for “good cause.”65  More significantly, what is now Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) made explicit the power of the court to limit discovery 
that was unduly burdensome or cumulative by adding an explicit cost-
benefit analysis that allows the judge to decide when enough is 
enough.66  This rebalancing reflects a different calibration in the 
tradeoffs between full discovery and other values, informed by the 
way that current litigation is being conducted.  And most recently, the 
sea change that electronic record keeping has made caused the 
drafters to add provisions calling special attention to discovery of 
electronic records and the need to balance the benefits and burdens of 
that subset of records with its special characteristics regarding search 
and retrieval capabilities in mind.67 
III 
JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES 
A.  Traditional Lawsuits 
One innovation of the Federal Rules is the recognition that there 
should be procedures available to enable the parties to add related 
claims and to enable and, in some cases, require that third parties be 
brought into what is a traditional case between a single plaintiff and a 
single defendant.  That innovation mainly removed existing barriers 
to that type of joinder and, in most of its manifestations, involved few 
if any significant tradeoffs.  There are, however, three Rules that do 
require tradeoffs and that are worthy of note because the beneficiaries 
of those Rules are often not the existing parties. 
Rule 13 deals with counterclaims, which are pleadings in which a 
defendant asserts a claim against the plaintiff that seeks affirmative 
relief for the defendant.  Rule 13(a) provides that, if a defendant has a 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii). 
67 Id. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii); id. 26(f)(3)(C); id. 34(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(D)–(E); id. 37(e). 
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counterclaim that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as 
the main claim (for example, a single automobile accident), the 
counterclaim is “compulsory,” meaning that, with limited exceptions, 
the defendant must assert it in this case or be barred from bringing it 
in the future.  In most situations, the defendant will want to add the 
counterclaim, but in some cases the defendant might prefer to wait, or 
to bring it in another forum, but Rule 13(a) forbids that.  Beyond 
whatever interest the parties have in seeing that the present case 
includes all related claims, there is an independent interest of a variety 
of third parties—including witnesses, judges, jurors, and other 
litigants who are waiting to have their cases heard—in seeing that the 
events giving rise to this lawsuit are the subject of only one judicial 
proceeding.  Through the compulsory counterclaim rule, the interest 
of the defendant in choosing the time and place of filing its claim is 
subordinated to the overall efficiency interest of the judicial system in 
having only one lawsuit for the controversy. 
Similar tradeoffs are made under Rule 19 (compulsory joinder of 
parties) and Rule 24 (intervention).  Under Rule 19, either an existing 
party or the court can point to the absence of a third party who is 
connected to the main transaction and who ought to be joined, if 
possible, in the interest of fairness or efficiency (although those are 
not the terms actually used).  If the requirements of the Rule are met, 
the party will be added as a plaintiff or defendant, as appropriate, 
even if the existing parties oppose the joinder.  However, if joinder is 
not possible because it will destroy subject matter jurisdiction or 
because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the party to be 
joined, the court must choose between allowing the action to proceed 
without joinder and dismissing the action, which will generally occur 
only if there is another forum where all parties can be joined.  The 
subject matter jurisdiction limit is significant because § 1367(b) 
precludes the use of supplementary jurisdiction to bring in additional 
nondiverse parties under Rule 19,68 in effect reaffirming the terms of 
the tradeoff made by Rule 19. 
Rule 24, which is often seen as a companion to Rule 19, allows 
third parties to seek to intervene in cases in which neither the plaintiff 
nor the defendant wishes to have them involved, but in which they 
have a substantial interest.  The conditions under which intervention, 
either general or limited, will be granted are not significant for this 
Article.  What is important is that the Rule allows the interests of third 
 
68 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2006). 
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parties and the systemic interest in overall efficiency to trump the 
interest of the existing parties in confining their lawsuit to the parties 
and issues they have chosen. 
B.  Class Actions 
The 1938 version of Rule 23 allowed some class actions, but it was 
not until 1966 that the Rule had real teeth.  The big change was the 
creation of the damages class action in Rule 23(b)(3), and in 
particular the decision to allow classes to go forward without class 
members having to take an affirmative step to join the class, but 
having the right to exclude themselves from the class—to “opt out.”  
Given the inertia among class members, especially in cases with small 
claims, insisting on “opt-in” classes would mean that most class 
actions would not go forward, which is plainly what defendants 
prefer.  The advantage given the plaintiffs by permitting opt-out 
classes can be seen as part of the overall effort to provide meaningful 
enforcement for federal and state law in the federal courts, and not 
just have laws on the books that do little to help their intended 
beneficiaries.  But at the same time, it substantially increased the 
stakes for defendants sued under Rule 23. 
The tradeoff was tempered by certain burdens that were placed on 
the named plaintiffs or, more realistically, their lawyers in damages 
class actions.  The first and most important was the requirement that, 
upon class certification, personal notice (which generally means 
notice by mail) had to be provided to each class member who could 
reasonably be identified and that the class (counsel) had to pay for 
it.69  Due process surely requires some kind of notice in order to bind 
the class, but where the cost of notice exceeds the value of the claim, 
or even amounts to a significant fraction of it, the requirement of 
individual notice can only be seen as a tradeoff that benefits 
defendants.  Indeed, it was defendants who insisted that the Rule be 
strictly followed, and the Supreme Court agreed.70 
The second major tradeoff in class actions, again motivated in part 
by due process considerations, relates to settlement.  Except for cases 
involving minors or persons who are adjudicated incompetents, 
parties are free to settle non-class cases without court approval.  But 
Rule 23(e) changes that, by requiring notice to the class, a hearing, 
 
69 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). 
70 Id. at 178–79. 
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and a specific finding by the court that any settlement of a certified 
class and any fees paid to class counsel be reasonable, regardless of 
what the named plaintiffs have agreed to accept and defendants have 
agreed to pay.71  The basic theory behind this requirement is that, 
because the entire class will be bound (unless a class member opts 
out), the possibility of selling out the class and overpaying class 
counsel necessitates some outside supervision because class members 
cannot be expected to monitor the case and they lack the power to 
stop improper settlements without assistance of the court. 
IV 
ERIE AND STATE LAW 
The statutes granting jurisdiction over diversity cases do not 
establish what law should apply in those cases.  Because there is no 
federal statute, treaty, or constitutional provision on which the claim 
is based, the federal courts could, at least in theory, apply federal 
common law, much as states apply their own common law for cases 
in which there is no applicable substantive statute.  That was the 
practice for nearly one hundred years, until the Supreme Court ended 
it in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,72 in which it held that state law, 
both common and statutory, governed the substantive aspects of 
diversity cases in federal court.  In part, Erie is a judicial recognition 
that policy choices and tradeoffs are made through state common-law 
adjudications as well as by the legislatures, and that those choices 
should be recognized by the federal courts absent specific federal law 
to the contrary.  In the same year that Erie was decided, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure became effective.  Most of those Rules were 
clearly procedural, not substantive, but there was still a question in 
some cases as to which law would govern if there were an otherwise-
applicable state law. 
The issue was starkly presented in the statute-of-limitations case of 
Hanna v. Plumer.73  A Massachusetts law required that a complaint 
be served personally on the executor of an estate, whereas the federal 
rule allowed the summons and complaint to be left with a person of 
suitable age at the home of the defendant.  The Court had previously 
held that state statutes of limitation were substantive for Erie 
purposes, and Massachusetts treated its service-of-process rules as 
 
71 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)–(2), (h). 
72 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
73 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
MORRISON 3/19/2012  8:13 AM 
2012] The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning 1021 
Civil Procedure System 
part of its statute of limitations.  There was no dispute that the 
executor actually received the complaint after it was left at his home, 
but because the claim arose under state law, the executor argued that 
the service rules were also substantive and hence state law, not the 
Federal Rule, controlled. 
The Court rejected the executor’s claim and applied the Federal 
Rule, which meant that the statute of limitations had been satisfied.  
In subsequent Erie cases, a number of which involved statutes of 
limitations, the Court has generally held that the Rule controlled, but 
not always.  This is not the place to assess the merits of the Court’s 
approach generally or as applied to particular cases, except as it 
relates to whether those cases illustrate the tradeoff principle.  At least 
in theory, the Court could have avoided the case-by-case resolution of 
tradeoffs it appears to have made under Erie.  One argument often 
made in these cases is that uniformity is a vital concern, and so the 
Federal Rules should always trump contrary state law if any Federal 
Rule is even arguably applicable.  The Court has recognized the 
importance of uniformity—Hanna is an example of where uniformity 
was a significant reason to support the result—but in some cases it 
has allowed local law that had a strong procedural element to it, such 
as Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,74 to govern at the price of 
loss of certainty and uniformity.  It has done so when important state 
policies were at issue, which justified the necessary tradeoff of 
rendering a Federal Rule at least partially inapplicable.  To be sure, in 
all Erie cases there are federal statutes that have considerable impact 
on the Court’s decisions, but none of them is so clear that they deny 
the Court any room for interpretation.  Thus, in construing these 
statutes and its own prior decisions in cases arising under state law, 
the Court has made, sometimes only implicitly, tradeoffs between 
uniform federal procedural law and upholding state policy choices in 
areas that are close to the procedural line. 
V 
APPEALS 
There are three examples applicable to appeals in the federal courts 
that involve clear tradeoffs.  The first is the final judgment rule,75 
under which an appeal may only be taken from a final judgment, a 
 
74 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
75 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
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term that is fairly strictly construed to mean only when the case is 
finally concluded.  That approach involves very significant tradeoffs 
(for example, denying an immediate appeal when a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a valid legal claim is 
rejected), thereby triggering extensive discovery and perhaps even a 
trial.  In such cases, defendants believe that the final judgment rule 
imposes great burdens on them and the trial court because an 
immediate appeal might end the case.  On the other side, plaintiffs 
will object to immediate appeals because they will delay the outcome 
or may require the plaintiff to litigate in both the trial and appeals 
courts at the same time.  Because most cases settle (although with a 
different balance when the plaintiff has successfully resisted an 
unappealable motion to dismiss), the refusal to allow an immediate 
appeal is not just a postponement of the appeal, but may result in no 
appeal at all.  The final judgment rule is clearly a tradeoff, rejecting 
the interest of the would-be appellant in an immediate appeal in favor 
of an appeal only at the conclusion of the case, at which time all 
issues remaining in the case can be taken up. 
The tradeoff embodied in the final judgment rule is not universally 
accepted.  New York, for example, allows a wide range of 
interlocutory appeals,76 and other jurisdictions fall somewhere in 
between.  Indeed, even in the federal system, the final judgment rule 
is not an absolute, but has exceptions whose underlying theme is that 
some decisions are so important that failure to allow interlocutory 
review will place unreasonable burdens on the parties or the court.   
One set of these exceptions is embodied in the collateral order rule, 
under which a narrow set of orders that plainly do not resolve the 
entire case are reviewable because of their importance and because, as 
a practical matter, if review is postponed until the end of the case, a 
reversal of the decision will not vindicate many of the policies behind 
the rule that the appellant urges.77  The most significant category of 
those cases involves rejections of claims by government officials for 
various kinds of immunity, often from liability for claims for money 
damages for alleged violations of constitutional rights.  The Court has 
held that such immunities do not merely remove the official from any 
liability, but they relieve that person from having to defend the case at 
 
76 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701 (McKinney 2011). 
77 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  Recently, the 
Court unanimously rejected a claim that the denial of a claim of attorney–client privilege 
fell within the collateral order rule and denied the right to an interlocutory appeal.  
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 608 (2009). 
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all.78  The extent of this exception to, or perhaps more properly, an 
interpretation of, the final judgment rule is not significant for these 
purposes.  Rather, what is important is that the exception represents a 
different balancing of the relevant interests in this category of cases, 
resulting in the official obtaining a right to an interlocutory appeal not 
enjoyed by most defendants. 
There are other examples of a right to an interlocutory appeal, such 
as from an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction, where 
an appeal only from a final order may be moot as a practical matter.  
But most of the exceptions make the appeal discretionary, unlike an 
appeal from a final judgment, which is a right.  For example, most 
denials of motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment are 
not appealable, but 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) allows a district court to 
certify such an order for immediate appeal under certain 
circumstances and allows the court of appeals to agree to hear that 
appeal if it chooses to do so.  Similarly, a motion granting or denying 
class certification has, since 1998, been considered so crucial to the 
outcome of the case that the losing party may seek immediate review 
of the class certification ruling under Rule 23(f), although the court of 
appeals has discretion as to whether to hear it.  In short, although the 
tradeoff between an immediate appeal and awaiting a final judgment 
is generally resolved in favor of the latter, that is not true in some 
categories of orders, where the desirability of an early appeal is seen 
to outweigh the normally overriding considerations to the contrary. 
A second example of tradeoffs in the appeal area involves the time 
for taking an appeal, or, more precisely, the fact that, unlike most 
litigation deadlines, that time cannot be extended except in narrowly 
defined circumstances.  The basic time is thirty days from entry of the 
final judgment,79 but that period is automatically extended if a motion 
is made under either Rule 52 or 59 to set aside the judgment.  Such a 
motion must be made within twenty-eight days from entry of 
judgment80—and, unlike almost every other civil motion—that 
period, which was ten days until December 1, 2009, cannot be 
extended.81  Once the judgment becomes final, the thirty days for 
filing an appeal can be extended only for very limited and quite 
specific reasons, generally those for which the appellant is not 
 
78 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
79 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). 
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b), 59(b). 
81 Id. 6(b)(2). 
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responsible, such as the clerk not sending out the final order.82  But 
even then, the forgiveness is limited in duration, and the terms of the 
exception are narrowly confined. 
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court found an appeal untimely, 
even though the appellant had acted in reliance on an error made by a 
federal judge and that error was not objected to, or even noted by, the 
opposing party, causing his appeal to be filed two days late.83  In the 
Court’s view, the times for taking an appeal are “jurisdictional,” 
meaning that neither the parties nor the courts can consent to or even 
order their enlargement, presumably because the virtues of certainty 
and finality outweigh the interest in fairness that a more flexible 
approach would countenance.  There is, of course, nothing in the 
nature of a time limit for an appeal that is any more fixed than any 
other deadline, and Congress could, if it wished, change the statutes, 
or the Court could change some of the Rules to produce a different 
tradeoff.  Those who disagree with the rigidity of the Supreme 
Court’s reading of the governing authorities do not suggest that rules 
about timing do not inevitably involve tradeoffs of various kinds; it is 
that they disagree with the choices the Court ascribes to those who 
wrote those statutes and rules. 
Third, the degree of deference given by appeals courts to decisions 
of trial courts and juries is another example of a set of tradeoffs.  One 
of those is contained in the Seventh Amendment, which generally 
forbids the reexamination of facts found by a jury.84  As a result, there 
is a very high—some would say nearly conclusive—willingness to 
tolerate jury error as a lesser evil than having appellate judges 
substituting their views on the facts for those of the jury.  But when 
the fact finder is the trial judge, Rule 52(a)(6) allows the court of 
appeals to set aside a factual finding if it is “clearly erroneous,” a 
more rigorous standard of review, under which a single judge’s view 
of the facts is given less deference than is that of a jury of six or more.  
There are those who would argue that, despite the advantage that a 
trial judge has in seeing live witnesses and being better able to judge 
their credibility, three judges with an opportunity to read the full trial 
record and discuss it with each other are at least as likely to make the 
correct factual findings, if not more so.  Even if, however, an 
appellate panel were better able to reach the correct result, the same 
 
82 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). 
83 Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207, 214 (2007). 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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standard might continue to be used because changing to a de novo 
review of factual findings would greatly increase the burdens on 
appellate courts and would encourage appeals, an alternative tradeoff 
that is generally considered to be less desirable.  And when the issue 
is whether, for example, the district court should have denied certain 
discovery or found that evidence that one party sought to have 
admitted at trial was cumulative, many of the same reasons for 
limiting review of claimed factual errors, as well as the generally 
case-specific nature of those questions, support the use of the current 
“abuse of discretion” standard and the tradeoffs that its use entails. 
The added-burden and increase-in-appeals arguments can also be 
made for issues of law, but there the standard is de novo review.  Part 
of the rationale for that standard is that the trial court has no 
comparable advantage on legal questions over that gained from seeing 
witnesses who testified on factual issues.  Indeed, the trial judge often 
has less time to consider legal issues than do appellate court judges, 
and the briefing at the appellate level is likely to be more complete 
and focused.  Finally, if the trial court makes a mistake on a factual 
matter, generally only the existing parties will suffer the 
consequences, whereas if there is an error of law that is not corrected 
on appeal, that may, as a practical matter, bind many others in similar 
situations.  For each of these standard-of-review issues, different 
people might make different tradeoffs that would produce different 
standards, but wherever the balance is struck, there will inevitably be 
tradeoffs of one kind or another. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea that procedural rules contain explicit as well as implicit 
tradeoffs is hardly a novel concept, but it is often one that law 
students do not appreciate.  The primary goal of this Article is to 
illustrate some of the many ways in which the rules and statutes 
governing civil procedure inevitably make tradeoffs between 
competing legitimate objectives.  It does not seek to present a 
comprehensive review of all such tradeoffs, or to evaluate whether the 
balances struck are correct, or even whether other factors might be at 
work in reaching them. 
This Article’s secondary goal is to urge those who write the rules, 
and the courts that interpret them, to be more explicit in 
acknowledging the tradeoffs that inevitably must be made.  That kind 
of openness would make it easier to evaluate the balance struck and to 
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apply the rules to specific cases.  Courts in particular become 
mechanical in some of their interpretations of procedural rules, which 
is especially unfortunate when there are policy reasons supporting the 
result that are part of the tradeoff that should be frankly 
acknowledged.  Rarely will a rule be so clear that it admits of only 
one reading, especially when a case is in a court of appeals, let alone 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  By pointing to the tradeoff supporting the 
outcome, courts will enlighten the parties and those who have the 
power to change the statute or rule and will also help lawyers and law 
students appreciate the inevitable tradeoffs necessary to a well-
developed system of civil procedure. 
MORRISON 3/19/2012  8:13 AM 
2012] The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning 1027 
Civil Procedure System 
APPENDIX 
THE IQBAL DILEMMA: A POSSIBLE RESPONSE 
Those who represent plaintiffs fear that the legacy of Iqbal will be 
to enable defendants who have exclusive possession of key evidence 
to obtain dismissal of many complaints because even plaintiffs with a 
good-faith belief that they can prove their case will not be able to 
supply the missing allegations that Iqbal arguably requires.  On the 
other side, defenders of increased pleading requirements assert that, 
without some controls, plaintiffs will make unsubstantiated factual 
allegations and be permitted to embark on extensive—and what 
defendants consider to be unwarranted and costly—discovery. 
One way out of this dilemma is to create an optional pre-suit 
exhaustion process that will give defendants the opportunity, but not 
the obligation, to show a would-be plaintiff that there is no factual 
support for the claim, as a way to dissuade its filing.  But if the 
defendant does not choose to provide that information to the plaintiff, 
the court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, could not grant the motion 
when the missing factual information was under the control of the 
defendant.  I have not attempted to draft a rule embodying this 
optional exhaustion opportunity, but I have set forth below some 
examples of how this might have worked in two recent cases, as well 
as in Iqbal and Twombly, and then I discuss other aspects of the 
proposal.  Before turning to those cases, I briefly examine a very 
common type of case in federal court, where the pleadings are always 
conclusory and sometimes implausible, yet are never dismissed under 
Rule 12(b)(6): actions under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).85 
A typical and procedurally proper FOIA complaint alleges that the 
defendant agency has certain records that the plaintiff requested, that 
the defendant denied the request for the records (and in some cases 
did not give any factual or legal basis for its denial), and that the 
denial was without basis in law—that is, none of the enumerated 
exemptions properly applies.  Based on only those bare-bones 
allegations, the defendant must provide the factual proof for its 
defense.  Even where the agency asserts that the records are properly 
classified, the courts insist that the agency come forward with some 
factual basis for its legal claims, no matter how conclusory the 
 
85 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
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complaint is (“unlawful” or “without basis in law” is pretty 
conclusory), or how implausible it is that an agency such as the CIA 
has improperly classified the records, let alone that a court would so 
find.  The reason why those cases are allowed to go forward is that 
the defendants are in full control of all the key evidence as to the 
applicability of the exemptions, and it would be unfair to require 
plaintiffs to show more at this stage of the case, notwithstanding Iqbal 
and Twombly.  But if the plaintiffs were given access to relevant 
factual information before filing suit, a court might be justified in 
insisting that the complaint take that information into account in 
determining whether Rule 12(b)(6) or perhaps Rule 56 entitles the 
defendant to dismissal. 
One of the areas where Iqbal and Twombly are expected to have a 
significant impact is in employment discrimination cases.  In a 
disparate impact case recently decided favorably for the plaintiffs by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the plaintiffs proved at trial that a cutoff 
score used by the City of Chicago to narrow the pool for firefighter 
applicants had a disproportionate adverse impact on African-
American applicants and lacked a business justification, thereby 
violating Title VII.86  There was no Iqbal problem there, because 
when Chicago announced the test results, it disclosed the adverse 
impacts on minorities.  But it is quite unlikely after Iqbal, especially 
for private employers, that they would make similar disclosures.  The 
plaintiffs would still file charges with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the defendant would not respond, and a 
right-to-sue letter would be issued.  After Iqbal, a plaintiff who 
alleged only that the cutoff score had a disparate impact on African-
Americans and that the cutoff lacked a business justification might 
have the complaint dismissed for including merely “conclusory” 
allegations, even though all the detailed information was in the 
control of the defendant.  Under this proposal, if the same sequence 
were followed, the court would be forbidden from dismissing the 
complaint on the ground that the allegations were conclusory because 
the defendant failed to provide the statistics showing the actual impact 
on the different races and did not offer any evidence, when it had the 
opportunity to do so before suit was filed. 
Or assume that a Toyota suddenly accelerated to ninety miles per 
hour and crashed into a tree, seriously injuring the driver.  Assume the 
complaint alleged that the car was negligently designed and 
 
86 Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2010). 
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manufactured and that there were breaches of various warranties, but 
no additional specifics as to the actual cause of the acceleration.  
Under at least some readings of Iqbal, the defendant might have the 
case dismissed for failure to include more information as to the cause 
of the accident.  However, under this proposal, if the plaintiff gave 
Toyota a copy of the proposed complaint containing those allegations, 
and defendant did not respond, the plaintiff would be able to defeat a 
motion to dismiss and commence discovery (assuming that there was 
no other legal basis on which the complaint might be dismissed). 
In Iqbal itself the Court held that the allegations that the U.S. 
Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) approved allegedly discriminatory policies were 
too indefinite to be allowed to go forward.87  The plaintiffs had made 
every reasonable effort to ascertain the facts as to what involvement, 
if any, those two officials had, including in discovery from other 
government defendants in that case, but they were rebuffed.  Of 
course, both defendants knew (or at least their official files would 
show) whether they had approved any policies regarding the detention 
of aliens after September 11, 2001, of the kind set forth in the 
complaint; they simply chose not to provide that information.  After 
the case was dismissed against the Attorney General and FBI 
Director, but allowed to continue against the remaining defendants, 
the plaintiff settled for the not insignificant sum of $265,000,88 which 
suggests that at least some of Iqbal’s allegations had considerable 
merit. 
If this proposal had been in effect, the plaintiff would have the 
option to present the claim to the proposed defendants, either in a 
letter or a draft complaint, which is essentially what claimants must 
do when suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
although there are no similar consequences under that law if the 
Government remains silent at the administrative level.89  The 
defendants would then have a choice: they could ignore the claim, or 
they could provide sworn statements denying any connection to any 
policy allegedly covered by the claim, and where appropriate, 
supporting documentary evidence—for example, copies of orders 
establishing that the policy was approved by others.  If they ignored 
the claim, they would be precluded from arguing as to information in 
 
87 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). 
88 Telephone Interview with Alexander Reinert, Plaintiff’s Counsel. 
89 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2006). 
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their possession, but not available to the plaintiff, that the complaint 
failed to set forth the claim with sufficient particularity.  They could 
move to dismiss on the ground that there was no legal basis for the 
claim, the kind of Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the dissenters and Iqbal’s 
counsel agreed was available.  But if the defendant provided relevant 
pre-suit evidence that countered allegations necessary to establish a 
claim, the plaintiff would have to present some basis (other than that 
they disbelieved the defendants) to avoid dismissal—rather like a 
mini summary judgment.  Thus, in the Iqbal situation, if the 
defendants provided only blanket denials of having issued the orders 
authorizing the challenged detention policies, and did not provide 
copies of the actual orders that bore on the detention of the class that 
plaintiff alleged included him, the case could not be dismissed under 
Rule 12(b)(6).  Similarly, if the defendants had not submitted any 
other evidence that someone else had approved the policies beyond a 
simple denial that they had not done so, the plaintiff would not be 
stuck with such unsupported general denials by persons not under 
oath or subject to cross-examination.  In other words, where there is 
likely to be a paper or e-mail trail, the defendant would generally 
have to provide the essential parts of it to take advantage of this 
option. 
In Twombly the Court found the allegations that the defendants had 
entered into an anticompetitive agreement to be implausible, 
especially in light of other allegations that pointed toward conscious, 
lawful parallel conduct.90  Under this proposal, if the plaintiff 
presented the draft complaint to the defendants and they did not 
respond, the issue of plausibility could no longer be the basis for a 
motion to dismiss.  On the other hand, the defendants could respond 
with affidavits from senior corporate officials, based on personal 
knowledge and an investigation described in the affidavits, stating 
that no meetings on this subject ever took place and that there were no 
records (paper or electronic) that supported a conclusion that an 
agreement among the defendants existed.  In that case, unless the 
plaintiff was able to be more specific than the plaintiff was in 
Twombly, the complaint would be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The advantage of this proposal to plaintiffs, at least compared with 
the possible negative outcomes under many if not all readings of 
Iqbal and Twombly, is that they would have a much better chance of 
obtaining discovery needed to prove their case.  In addition, if the 
 
90 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007). 
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defendants had a valid explanation or defense, the plaintiff (or more 
precisely the plaintiff’s lawyer) would not file the case, for fear of 
both wasting time and money and possibly suffering Rule 11 
sanctions.  In addition, in at least some cases, if there were pre-suit 
exchanges of information in which the defendants would have a stake 
in conducting them in a meaningful way, settlement discussions based 
on facts and not just suspicions might occur. 
Some of these benefits will also accrue to defendants, but they 
would have to make a choice when a proposed complaint arrives.  In a 
case with significant financial or other risk, they will surely want to 
consult with counsel in deciding whether to respond by engaging with 
the plaintiff.  Engaging means some exchange of information, 
although much less than in formal discovery because the process is 
voluntary and can be stopped at any point.  But there is no reason why 
this limited discovery cannot run in both directions, so that defendants 
will have a better idea what to expect and may decide that early 
settlement is in their best interests as well—something that rarely 
happens under the current system.  And if defendants truly believe 
that suits are frivolous, telling plaintiffs that early, with evidence to 
support their position, will help with motions seeking sanctions under 
Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
Resorting to such a process might produce statute-of-limitations 
problems in some cases.  Ideally, there would be an automatic tolling 
of the statute while this option was pending.  However, given the 
limits of the Rules Enacting Act and the Rules of Decision Act, it is 
doubtful that the rules themselves could accomplish that.91  Nothing 
would prevent the parties from entering a tolling agreement, but even 
if they did not, an exhaustion period lasting only sixty days or so 
should not cause many statute-of-limitations problems, especially if 
the process were used promptly after the injury was discovered, 
before the statute was a real concern. 
Plaintiffs may object to this proposal because, in theory, defendants 
could submit false statements, make general denials, or withhold 
documents.  As to false statements, requiring that they be under 
penalty of perjury, coupled with the fact that in many cases there will 
be multiple persons with knowledge of the truth, should minimize, but 
probably not completely eliminate, that possibility.  As for general 
 
91 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)); Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
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denials and withholding documents, courts will have to examine those 
issues on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the defendant 
acted in good faith and was entitled to the protections afforded by this 
proposal for doing so.  Put another way, this proposal is not perfect, 
but it is better for plaintiffs than the most likely reading of Iqbal, and 
it is a reasonable tradeoff that responds to whatever legitimate 
objections defendants actually have. 
 
